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ABSTRACT. In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently 
used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of 
point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is  
a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at 
the same time a non-P (simpliciter), because it is a P only relative to some 
point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is a major, 
complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is sup-
posed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively un-
derstood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homonymous expression, and so there 
is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose  
a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term 
‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed ob-
ject in question, it results in a (set of) evaluating proposition(s) about the ob-
ject. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s atti-
tude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I 
we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying 
a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according 
to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and 
b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that 
the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of 
agents’ attitudes. We explain how an agent can believe of something that 
it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different view-
point criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting 
in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case 
of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of atti-
tudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical 
traffic back and forth between such attitudes unless some additional as-
sumptions are added, and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of 
conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and ana-
lyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, final-
ly, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be pre-
served, this time, however, in its extensional version. 
KEYWORDS. Point of view, perspective, transparent intensional logic, in-
tension, requisite, attitudes, de dicto/de re supposition, conceptual view-
point, definition. 
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4. Points of view, attitudes and inversion of perspective 
In Part I we introduced a common scheme of the logical type of the  
entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: 
when applied to the respective criterion of evaluation and an abstract 
or concrete object it results in an evaluating proposition about the ob-
ject: V(iew)/(  ). As above, ,  are any types,  the type of the  
‘viewing criterion’,  the type of the object that is viewed by an agent. 
We analysed typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent para-
dox. These cases were examined according to the type of the viewed  
object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is  
a property or an office. Now we are going to show that the method  
described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ att i-
tudes. 
 It might seem that if the agent applies a point of view to an object, i.e., 
if he (correctly) evaluates the criterion and obtains the resulting proposi-
tion, then he has to assent to the statement claiming the truth of the ob-
tained proposition P. In other words, the agent’s believing that P should 
be justified, and the association between the respective point of view and 
an attitude to P would be the relation of logical consequence or other-
wise logical in nature. For instance, if somebody applies the ‘age-crite-
rion’ to 80-year old Charles, obtaining thus the proposition that Charles 
is an old man, he should believe (and know) that Charles is an old man. 
However, we will show that situation is not that simple. For it is logical-
ly possible that an agent applies a criterion to an object, yet fails to be-
lieve that the resulting proposition P is true, if the proposition is pre-
sented to him in an incomprehensible way. Hence the agent may fail to 
adopt the attitude that P. We envisage interplay between agents, points 
of view and attitudes consisting in an agent’s applying a point of view, 
and arriving at an attitude. The idea behind, as it were, slotting points of 
view in between agents and attitudes is to provide a rationale for an 
agent to adopt an attitude. So what follows below is an outline of atti-
tude acquisition via points of view per se. 
 In general, what we have called ‘viewing criterion’ is always some at-
tribute or a set of attributes, whose application to the viewed object orif 
the viewed object is an intensionto the bearers of an intension deter-
mines the resulting proposition. A possible dialogue could elucidate the 
theoretical analyses above. 
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 A: Yesterday I met Charles. He is already rather old. 
 B: Nonsense! Charles is in many respects younger than many of us. 
 A: What do you say! He is already over 70. 
 B: Well, from the viewpoint of age you are justified in claiming that he 
is old. I only say that the viewpoint of age is not the only possibility. 
 A: What do you mean? I don’t understand. 
 B: Did you notice his activities? He plays tennis, swims rather quick-
ly, organises some linguistic courses, is full of various interests, so 
I would really say that he is rather young. 
 A: Why not, but then you believe that he is old and, at the same time, 
young. A bit strange, wouldn’t you say?  
 B: I see that your language game is ‘dialectic’. I do not accept the 
paradoxical character of your claim; to be old from the viewpoint 
of age is well compatible with being young from the viewpoint of 
activities, these two predicates are not antonyms.  
Remark: Viewpoints concern in most cases vague predicates. Applying  
a viewpoint can be construed as a kind of explication. (Remember 
OldAge, YoungAct.) The fact that such ‘viewpoint-like’ explications are not 
‘absolute’ and that they are dependent on the agent who applies his/her 
viewpoint can be seen from the very scheme of the viewpoint function: 
 [Viewwt Criterion Object]. 
 Let a particular criterion be fixed (say, Age) as well as the object (say, 
Charles). Consider a definite value of the criterion applied to the object 
(say, 60 years). The proposition produced by the particular viewpoint 
may be Charles is oldAge but it may be also Charles is not oldAge. This means 
that the same argument is as if connected with two values, which would 
show that the View would not be a function in spite of its type. This is 
impossible, of course. So we have to admit that the Views may be distinct 
for the same argument. Here we can see that this theoretical possibility is 
frequently realised in practice due to the fact that the various distinct 
Views are selected by various agents whose ways of evaluating the crite-
rion may differ. 
 It would seem that we could set up a theory of attitudes by defining 
relations-in-intension between agents, of type , and (the results of points 
of view, i.e.) propositions, of type . In §2 the type of propositional atti-
tudes was already indicated, to wit (  ). 
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 The element of attitude logic we will be concerned with here concerns 
the perspective that each attitude comes with. It is a thrice told tale that  
a  b and b  a determine one and the same situation (whether the situa-
tion is a mathematical fact or an empirical state-of-affairs), involving two 
distinct perspectives on the same situation. We have to teach a student to 
adopt a correct logical perspective on ‘it is not true that if A then B’ so 
that she would know that ‘A and not B’ is equivalent to the former, de-
noting the same truth-condition. Otherwise she may easily believe the 
former without believing the latter. The notion of difference in perspec-
tive may be captured in various ways. One way, in particular, is to dis-
tinguish between attitudes de dicto and attitudes de re. Another, maybe 
more promising, way is to distinguish between attitudes to the ‘situa-
tion’, i.e., to a proposition, and attitudes to a construction of this proposi-
tion, the way in which the proposition is presented. Therefore, besides 
‘propositional attitudes’ of type (  ) we will also investigate con-
structional ‘hyper-propositional attitudes’ of type (  n). We will call 
the former implicit attitudes and the latter explicit attitudes. The distinc-
tion between implicit and explicit attitudes enables us to distinguish be-
tween ‘rational and irrational’ behaviour of an agent. In the case of im-
plicit attitudes to a proposition the agent cannot behave irrationally. If he 
has applied a particular viewpoint and evaluated the criterion leading to 
a proposition P, then it logically follows that the agent (implicitly but not 
explicitly) accepts P and has an attitude (of justified belief) to P. First, we 
will investigate the de dicto and de re forms of implicit attitudes, and at 
the end of this section we examine de dicto and de re explicit attitudes. We 
will analyse sentences of the form 
 X B’s that the F is a G 
(e.g., Charles believes that the Pope is in danger) 
to be contrasted with 
 The F is B(ed) by X to be a G 
(e.g., The Pope is believed by Charles to be in danger) 
where B is an attitude verb like ‘believe’, ‘know’, ‘doubt’, ‘think’, etc., X is 
an agent (alias ‘believer’). Since there is also somebody who reports on the 
situation, and who matters here as well, we will call this person a reporter.1 
                                                 
1   A sophisticated distinction between reporting and attributing an attitude is irrelevant to 
our purposes here. 
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 What we propose here is to juxtapose attitudes de dicto and their de re 
counterparts. Our main reason for so doing is that an inversion of perspec-
tive comes to the fore. In general, using a de dicto form, the reporter is 
supposed to loyally represent the perspective that the agent has on some 
particular matter. On the other hand, using a de re form, the reporter is 
responsible for ascribing the property of being believed by the agent to 
be the/an F.2 Consider, for instance, the following two attributions: 
 (1)  Charles believes that the Pope is in danger. 
(the Pope occurs de dicto) 
 (2)  Charles believes of the Pope that he is in danger. 
(the Pope occurs de re) 
 Somebody might wonder though, whether there is any semantic dif-
ference between (1) and (2). An example may serve to bring out the need 
to distinguish between attitudes de dicto and de re. Consider a variant of 
(1) and (2): 
 (3)  Charles believes that the Pope is not the Pope. 
 (4)  Charles believes of the Pope that he is not the Pope. 
 In (3) we balk at attributing to Charles the belief that the Pope is not 
the Pope, if by this is meant that Charles believes that (the person who 
is) the Pope is not the Pope. Only “paraconsistent popes” are capable of 
pulling this trick. But there is a way around attributing a paradoxical atti-
tude to Charles, namely by having him believe of the person who is the 
Pope that he is not the Pope. An equivalent formulation is that the person 
who is the Pope is such that he is believed by Charles not to be the Pope: 
 (5)  The Pope is believed by Charles not to be the Pope. 
 It is the reporter who is responsible for creating an air of paradox by 
employing the individual office of the Pope twice over, for any office co-
occupied by the Pope would have served equally well. E.g., the reporter 
might instead have said that the German with the highest clerical rank in 
the Vatican is such that he is believed by Charles not to be the Pope; 
equivalently, that Charles believes of the German with the highest cleri-
cal rank in the Vatican that he is not the Pope. In general, the property of 
being believed by Charles to be an or the  is type-theoretically no dif-
                                                 
2   ‘X believes of the F that it is a G’ and ‘The F is believed by X to be a G’ are treated as 
equivalent formulations. 
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ferent from the property of being happy, say. Its construction, on the 
other hand, is somewhat more involved than the construction of being 
happy. The point is now that if the offices of the Pope and of the German 
with the highest clerical rank in the Vatican are co-occupied at the world 
and time where Charles has an attitude de re involving one of the offices, 
then the other office may be substituted for it. The reporter uses the of-
fice only as a ‘pointer’ to the individual to whom he ascribes the proper-
ty of being believed by Charles not to be the Pope.  
 This is evidently not the case with respect to attitudes de dicto. Our 
method of distinguishing between attitudes de dicto and de re turns on 
whether the relevant office is picked out in a de dicto or de re way. In the 
former case the construction of the office is used de dicto and the whole 
office is thus the object of predication. In the latter case the construction 
of the office is used de re and the occupant of the office at the given 
world and time is the object of predication. 
 Here is a schematic example of how an attitude de dicto and an atti-
tude de re are constructed.3 For the sake of simplicity, we investigate first 
implicit attitudes B of type (  ). Moreover, we have here Ch/, 
F/, G/(), x ranging over : 
 (6)  wt [0Bwt 0Ch w*t* [0Gw*t* 0Fw*t*]] 
(0F de dicto – ‘… that the F is G’) 
Here the whole proposition that the F is a G (constructed by w*t* 
[0Gw*t* 0Fw*t*]) is the object of predication, and so is the whole office F. 
 (7)  wt [wt x [0Bwt 0Ch w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]]wt 0Fwt], 
or equivalently 
 (7) wt [x [0Bwt 0Ch w*t* [0Gw*t* x]] 0Fwt] 
(0F de re – ‘… of the F that it is G’) 
Analysis (7) may call for elucidation. The de re case can be read as:4  
 The F is (i.e., has a property of being) believed by Charles to be a G. 
The property of being believed by Charles to be a G is constructed as fol-
lows: 
                                                 
3   For technical explanations see Duží (2004). 
4   Here we analyse the passive variant like (5) of the de re attitude. For a direct analysis of 
the active variant by using Sub and Tr functions, see (9) below or, e.g., Duží (2006). 
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 [wt x [0Bwt 0Ch w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]] 
Applying this property at a given w,t to the occupant of the office F (at 
that w,t), we obtain the desired analysis (7). The construction of the office 
F has been subjected to intensional descent with respect to reporter’s 
perspective (i.e. composed with reporter’s w, t). 
 It is a complicating factor that a construction of an office which has 
already undergone intensional descent may still occur de dicto in a larger 
context, particularly in the case of attitudes de dicto. The philosophical 
motivation is that the existential requirement associated with an occur-
rence de re must be suspended in certain cases. In our examples (1) and 
(2), F is the office of the Pope, G is the property of being in danger. Thus 
whereas (1) may still be true even if there is no Pope, (2) will have no 
truth-value in such a case. The truth-condition, or proposition, construct-
ed by (6) is fulfilled by any world-time pair WT where Charles has a be-
lief to the effect that the whole proposition is true (regardless whether there 
is a unique F there and then; the proposition, and thus the office F, is 
mentioned). The asterisks are a heuristic device fixing which occurrences 
of w, t fall inside Charles’ perspective. 
 On the other hand, the truth-condition constructed by (7) is fulfilled 
by any WT where F at this WT is an element of the set which is (in this 
WT) the extension of the property of being believed by Charles to be a G. 
Notice that the indices of F are outside Charles’ perspective this time. 
The reporter might just as well have used any other co-occupied (in W, 
T) office as a pointer to the individual that has the property of being be-
lieved by Charles to be a G. In other words, (7), as well as its negated 
form, namely 
 wt [wt x [0Bwt 0Ch w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]]wt 0Fwt], 
entail that the F exists in W, T. 
 Recalling our preliminary characterisation of the de dicto/de re distinc-
tion (see §2): Construction C is used in the de re supposition in a con-
struction C’ iff C is subjected in C’ to an intensional descent with respect 
to reporter’s perspective w, t, otherwise C occurs de dicto in C’. But what 
is the difference between those two kinds of attitudes after all? For, are 
those two constructions not -equivalent? No, they are not, appearances 
notwithstanding. Even the asterisk notation ‘renaming’ variables w, t, 
which does prevent collision of variables, does not make it possible to 
equivalently perform the respective -reduction, for we would get: 
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 (7r) wt [0Bwt 0Ch w*t* [0Gw*t* 0Fwt]]. 
 Now (7r) is obviously not equivalent to (6); 0F has been subjected to 
intensional descent, this time with respect to the reporter’s perspective, 
not Charles’. Hence the construction of the office F still occurs de re, not 
de dicto according to the above characteristics. Worse, (7r) is not even 
equivalent to (7). Since F is a properly partial function, in some WT 
pairs the construction 0Fwt is v-improper. Due to the Compositionality 
principle, the partiality of one constituent of a complex renders the entire 
complex vulnerable to partiality5 (partiality is ”propagated up”). There-
fore, if 0Fwt is v-improper at some WT, the whole composition 
 [x [0Bwt 0Ch w*t* [0Gw*t* x]] 0Fwt] 
is v-improper, and the proposition constructed by (7) does not have  
a truth-value in such a W at such a T. On the other hand, -closure can 
never be v-improper.6 For those WT-pairs where the construction 0Fwt is 
v-improper, the closure w*t* [0Gw*t* 0Fwt] v-constructs a degenerated 
function not defined on any argument, and the proposition constructed 
by (7r) can be true or false (Charles can be related to such a degenerated 
function). In other words, (7r) does not entail the existence of the F, un-
like (7β) and (7). 
 Thus the correct analysis of the de re case is a non-reduced form (7) or 
(7), but not (7r). Partiality, which models the WT-relative vacancy of 
offices, throws a spanner in the works by blocking unrestricted -
conversion between the constructions of attitudes de re and de dicto. The 
above characterisation of the de dicto/de re occurrence has thus to be ad-
justed as follows:  
Let C’  α occur as a constituent (i.e. used subconstruction) of  
a construction C. The occurrence of C’ is used in the de re supposition 
in the construction C iff C’ occurs in the composition with the con-
structions of its arguments, i.e. C’wt, and C’ does not occur as a con-
stituent of another proper subconstruction C’’ of C (i.e., 0C’’  0C) such 
that C’’ occurs in the de dicto supposition (the de dicto context is domi-
nant). Otherwise C’ occurs de dicto in C.7 
                                                 
5   See Part I, Definition 2, Note 3. 
6   See Part I, Definition 2, Note 4. 
7   In Duží (2004) the occurrence of 0F in the problematic construction (7r) has been la-
belled as de re. In Duží (2006, 202 – 203) the question whether such an occurrence 
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 The truth-condition of (7) comes with an additional requirement 
which is not found in (6). The additional constraint is that F must be 
non-vacant at WT. And whether it is, is no trivial matter since F is  
a properly partial function. E.g., some world-time pairs have no Pope to 
offer at all, others have exactly one. Whether there is a Pope or not, 
Charles may well believe that the Pope is happy. Analogously, whether 
or not the site of Troy exists, Schliemann may still seek the site of Troy. 
But Schliemann could not possibly find the site of Troy, if there was no 
site of Troy to be found in the first place. By the same token, it is impos-
sible for Charles to believe of the Pope that he is happy, if there is no 
Pope around of whom to believe that he is happy. This is parallel to 
claiming that if there is no unique Pope at WT then it is neither true nor 
false that the Pope is happy at WT. The bottom line is that attitudes de re 
come with an existential presupposition, and it is interesting to note that 
this holds whether these attitudes are taken to be ‘difficult’ or ‘easy’ to 
come by. In either case the existence of some particular res is required.  
 What attitudes de re are supposed to do, on the other hand, is a some-
what contentious issue. R. Foley distinguishes between two accounts of 
beliefs de re: 
[T]hose accounts that make it relatively difficult to believe de re of an object 
that it has some characteristic, because they require believers to have a spe-
cial, intimate relation of some sort with objects about which they have de re 
beliefs; and those accounts that do not require there to be such a relation and 
thus make it relatively easy to have de re beliefs (Foley 1986, 332 – 333). 
 The difference is whether the agent either must or need not know 
which object is the res in question. This rather vague formulation can be 
made more precise using TIL to distinguish between offices and their oc-
cupants. The agent, or believer, must have a kind of an ‘intimate rela-
tion’ to the individual that is singled out by the reporter via an office. But 
the agent does not have to connect this individual with the respective of-
fice. The reporter uses the office as a pointer to the res, the believer does 
not. Hence our account is of Foley’s second kind. Indeed, the agent of an 
attitude de re need do absolutely nothing to entertain such an attitude. 
What he must do, however, is having already adopted some other atti-
                                                 
should be called de dicto or de re has been left open. However, in both papers we 
warned against an inadequate use of the β-reduced construction of type (7r) for ana-
lysing sentences with the de re existential presupposition.   
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tude, whether de dicto or de re, since attitudes de re on our construal are 
parasitic on prior attitudes. 
 The inversion of perspective alluded to above consists in the perspec-
tive shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de 
re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto.8 
One crucial upshot of handling these notions in TIL, however, is that there 
is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes. They 
are not equivalent. But the inversions will begin to flow once an additional 
premise is added, providing both the fulfilment of the existential require-
ment and the agent’s knowledge of who satisfies the requirement. In this 
connection it is important to underline that it makes no logical difference if 
the roles of reporter and believer are played by the same individual.   
 Our claim is that the proposition constructed by (6) does not entail 
the proposition constructed by (7), nor vice versa. To see this, consider the 
following. Proposition (6) does not entail proposition (7), because the lat-
ter has an existential presupposition that (6) does not have. In (6) the is-
sues whether F is vacant and, if occupied, who happens to occupy F are 
irrelevant (from the reporter’s point of view). Not so with (7), where the 
requirement crops up and it is relevant if some distinct office F’ happens 
to share its occupant with F at WT. (7) does not entail (6): Even if F is oc-
cupied (and Charles has some ‘intimate relation’ to an individual who 
happens to be the F), it is not eo ipso so that Charles has any (de dicto) be-
lief about F. And even if Charles does have any beliefs about F, and there 
is some F’ such that F, F’ coincide at WT, it is not eo ipso so that Charles 
has any (de dicto) beliefs about F’. Though the following argument  
  At WT, Charles believes that the F is a G 
  At WT, Charles knows that the F is the F’      
  At WT, Charles believes that the F’ is a G 
is valid, it still does not enable us to logically transform the above de dicto 
beliefs to the de re ones, or vice versa. Charles’ knowledge that the F is the 
F’ entails that both offices are occupied at WT thanks to the factivity of 
knowledge: 
 At WT, Charles knows that the F is the F’. 
 Hence, at WT, the F is the F’. 
 Hence, at WT, F and F’ are occupied. 
                                                 
8   For inversion of perspective, see also Jespersen (2001). 
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Formally: 
  [0Kwt 0Ch w*t* [0Fw*t* = 0F’w*t*]] 
  [0Fwt = 0F’wt] 
  [0Occwt 0F], [0Occwt 0F’]. 
K receives the same type as B, while Occ(upied) is an empirical property 
of offices, of type ( ).  
 The problem consists in the fact that Charles does not have to know 
who is the occupant of either office.  Imagine a situation where Charles 
reads in a trustworthy journal that the Pope is the head of the Roman-
Catholic Church and as such is in danger. Being an ignorant, our Charles 
does not know that Joseph Ratzinger is the Pope, and the reporter is not 
entitled to claim that Charles believes of the Pope that he is in danger. On 
the other hand, Charles may believe that Ratzinger is in danger without 
knowing that Ratzinger is the Pope. In such a situation the reporter may 
claim that Charles believes of the Pope that he is in danger, but cannot 
truly make a de dicto claim to the effect that Charles believes that the 
Pope is in danger. 
 To be able to mutually transform de dicto and de re attitudes, we need 
still a stronger premise, swapping knowledge for belief, namely: 
 Charles knows that the F is (occupied by) X. (F/, X/) 
This fresh premise kills two birds with one stone. First, due to factivity 
of knowledge, it is true that the F is X: 
 wt [0Fwt = 0X] 
and 
 wt [0Occwt 0F]. 
 Second, Charles’ knowledge of the (contingent) occupation of F at WT 
by X entails that X belongs to the extension of the property of being be-
lieved by Charles to be a G, and since X is the value at w, t of the inten-
sion constructed by 0F, the respective de dicto and de re attitudes are mu-
tually transferable ‘via X’. However, in order to perform the transform, 
we need another assumption that knowing entails believing. This is 
plausible providing we consider the ordinary meaning of ‘knowing’ and 
‘believing’. Thus we dismiss situations like when somebody “knows that 
P” without being convinced of it. Thus the additional assumptions and 
their consequences are as follows: 
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 (i)  Charles knows that the F is (occupied by) X; 
 (i’)  wt [0Kwt 0Ch [wt [0Fwt = 0X]]]. 
Since knowing is a factivum, (i) entails 
 (ii)  The F is (occupied by) X;  
 (ii’) wt [0Fwt = 0X]. 
Since knowing entails believing, (i) entails 
 (iii) Charles believes that the F is X; 
 (iii’) wt [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Fwt = 0X]]]. 
The inversion of perspective then comes about in the following manner:  
 a) De dicto  de re 
 (iv) Charles believes that the F is a G; 
 (iv’) wt [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt 0Fwt ]]].  
By introducing a conjunction we get: 
 (v)  Charles believes that the F is a G and also that the F is X; 
 (v’) wt [[0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt 0Fwt ]]]  [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Fwt = 0X]]]]. 
 Now, we consider the implicit belief, i.e., the relation of Charles to  
a proposition, an object of type . However, if Charles believes, knows, 
doubts, etc., a proposition P, then it does not mean that Charles is able to 
grasp the whole intension P/, i.e., the actual uncountable infinity. No-
body (except perhaps omniscient God) is able to do so. But when under-
standing the meaning wt [0Gwt 0Fwt ], he is able to evaluate the instruction 
in any W, at any T; in other words, he has an access to the potential infinity. 
And in any W at any T when Charles evaluates the propositions construct-
ed by [wt [0Gwt 0Fwt ]] and [wt [0Fwt = 0X]] as being true, he also as-
sents to the fact that [[0GWT 0FWT ]  [0FWT = 0X]] gives true, and also that 
[0GWT 0X] is true. In other words, from the implicit-belief point of view the 
state of affairs WT in which both the propositions are true is indistinguish-
able from the state of affairs WT in which the proposition constructed by 
[wt [0Gwt 0X]] is true. Hence Charles is committed to believe the latter: 
 (vi) Charles believes that X is a G; 
 (vi’) wt [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt 0X]]]. 
By abstracting over X we get 
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 (vii) X is believed by Charles to be a G; 
 (vii’) wt [x [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt x]]] 0X]. 
Now (ii) and (vii) give by substitution of identicals 
 (viii) The F is believed by Charles to be a G; 
 (viii’) wt [x [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt x]]] 0Fwt]. 
 b) De re  de dicto 
 (ix) The F is believed by Charles to be a G; 
 (ix’) wt [x [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt  x]]] 0Fwt].  
Since the F is X, (ii) and (ix) give 
 (x)  X is believed by Charles to be a G; 
 (x’) wt [x [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt  x]]] 0X]. 
Since 0X cannot be v-improper, by β-reduction (x) entails 
 (xi) Charles believes that X is a G; 
 (xi’) wt [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt  0X]]]. 
By introducing a conjunction to (iii) and (xi) we get: 
 (xii) Charles believes that X is a G and also that the F is X; 
 (xii’) wt [[0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt 0X ]]]  [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Fwt = 0X]]]]. 
Now, by way of the same reasoning as above (xii) entails (xiii): 
 (xiii) Charles believes that the F is a G; 
 (xiii’) wt [0Bwt 0Ch [wt [0Gwt 0Fwt]]]. 
 The proof relies heavily on the fact that attitudes to propositions 
implicit attitudesare closed under the relation of logical entailment. 
Moreover, an essential assumption is Charles’ knowing that the F is oc-
cupied by X. This X enables us to perform a both-ways transformation 
via -conversion, because it cannot be subjected to intensional descent 
and thus be v-improper. 
 To sum up, a prerequisite for attributing an attitude de re to someone is 
that the reporter must know that the relevant office is occupied at WT, and 
if he wishes to substitute F’ for F he must know that they coincide at WT. 
The believer need know neither. Substituting a construction of one (co-
occupied) office for another in the case of attitudes that are already de re is 
one way of generating another attitude de re. A different way is to take as 
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premises an attitude de dicto involving F and the believer’s knowledge of 
who is the F at WT, and deduce the conclusion that the believer has an atti-
tude de re about F. An attitude de re can’t come into being ex nihilo, because 
the agent needs first to believe or know that somebody is something in or-
der to introduce a property and an office. Only then can the reporter begin 
to query whether the office is occupied so that the agent’s attitude content 
(i.e., a construction) can be approached from the reporter’s own vantage 
point. On this point we are in agreement with Foley:  
[C]ases involving de re beliefs about epistemically remote objects are cases 
where it is plausible to think that the person has these beliefs in virtue of hav-
ing other beliefs… (Foley 1986, 341). 
 The ascription of any attitude is, of course, wrapped within the re-
porter’s inescapably idiosyncratic perspective, but the attribution must 
be such that the believer not only would, but must endorse it as his own. 
This requirement is typically cashed out in the demand that the believer, 
if confronted with a sentence describing the attitude attributed to him, 
would, and rationally must, assent to it.  
 Yet, as stated above, an agent sometimes behaves as if irrational. An 
agent does apply a point of view, evaluates the respective criterion, ob-
taining thus a proposition, and still does not assent to this proposition. 
How is this possible? The problem consists in the fact that the agent’s be-
liefs and knowledge are sensitive to the way in which the respective proposi-
tion is presented. In other words, an agent’s knowledge and beliefs pri-
marily concern concepts, i.e. constructions of propositions. 
 So far we have considered implicit (i.e. intensional) attitudes; relations 
to propositions. Such attitudes are actually rather non-realistic attitudes 
of an idealistic agent with unlimited inferential capabilities, i.e., of a logi-
cal/mathematical genius. In Artificial Intelligence the distinction be-
tween explicit and implicit knowledge plays an important role. Explicit 
knowledge is that what is explicitly recorded in a knowledge base, 
whereas implicit knowledge is that what can be obtained from the for-
mer by means of a particular (proper, correct) inference machine. It is  
a well-known fact (due to Gödel’s incompleteness results) that regard-
less of how sophisticated an inference machine is, there is never going to 
be an absolutely perfect machine that would be capable of mechanically 
deducing all the logical consequences, all the implicit knowledge. These 
facts trigger the question whether a more fine-grained, non-intensional 
analysis of attitudes might be at hand. The problem was brought up al-
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ready by Frege, and since then logicians strive after structured meanings 
that would adequately render the identity of beliefs in attitude contexts. 
Carnap’s attempts at solving the problem by means of the notion of in-
tensional isomorphism have been proved to be inadequate by Church.9 
Cresswell answers in the affirmative way, dubbing the problematic con-
texts hyper-intensional, and proposing what he calls structured meanings as 
solution. In TIL we agree both with hyper-intensional individuation of 
attitude relata and structured meanings. However, our manner of flesh-
ing out the latter is different. We cannot accept Cresswell’s, and others’, 
assumption that tuples are structures in the desired sense, and instead 
offer compositions and closures as structured meanings.10 
 Besides the above implicit attitudes to propositions we have to con-
sider explicit attitudes to the constructions of propositions, i.e., to hyper-
propositions. Implicit attitudes are closed under the relation of logical 
consequence and the transfer between de dicto/de re attitudes is realisable 
under some additional conditions. However, the natural demand that 
the believer, if confronted with a sentence describing the attitude at-
tributed to him, would, and rationally must, assent to it, does not have to 
be met. The agent in question does not have to be able to perform the re-
spective inferences, his logical/mathematical skills being limited. In other 
words, he need not (explicitly) know that he (implicitly) knows/believes 
that …; the agent may behave, so to say, logically irrationally.  
 In order that the agent shall behave rationally, the proposition that 
has been obtained by the agent’s applying a point of view has to be pre-
sented by the reporter in a way synonymous to the way the agent would 
use. Repeating briefly: 
Synonymous expressions are such expressions which express exactly 
the same construction of the denoted object.11 
Equivalent expressions are such expressions which denote one and the 
same object o possibly via distinct constructions that are equivalent in 
the sense of all constructing o. 
 Explicit attitudes are defined as relations-in-intension to a construction 
of a proposition. They are of type (  k), k being mostly equal to 1. The 
                                                 
9   See Carnap (1947), Church (1954), Cresswell (1985). 
10  For tuples as structures see Jespersen (2002). 
11  Actually, synonymous expressions express one and the same concept, see Chapter 5. 
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(schema of) analysis of de dicto and the respective de re attitude be as fol-
lows (here we have: Be/(  1), Ch/, F/, G/(), x ranging over ). 
 De dicto case: 
 (8)  wt [0Bewt 0Ch 0[w*t* [0Gw*t* 0Fw*t*]] ]  
(0F de dicto – ‘… that the F is G’) 
 The de re case is rather more complicated. We first analyse the passive 
variant, and then by using valid -reduction we obtain the analysis of 
the active variant. To this end we have to construct the property of being 
explicitly believed by Charles to be a G. The first attempt of doing so in 
an analogous way as in the implicit case is not correct:  
 [wt x [0Bewt 0Ch 0[w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]]]. 
For, there is a technical problem here. The variable x occurs as a constit-
uent of a construction that has been trivialised: 0[w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]. Hence 
the variable x is -bound here and cannot become -bound, cannot be so 
simply abstracted on. The philosophical explanation: Those who are ex-
plicitly believed by the agent Charles to be so-and-so are completely 
wrapped within his perspective, and thus as if not accessible. To over-
come the problem, we use the function Sub(stitution)12 of type (nnnn), 
which, when applied to a triple of constructions C1, C2, C3, returns the 
construction C that is the result of correctly substituting C1 for C2 in C3. 
The property of being explicitly believed by Charles to be a G is a criteri-
on that can be applied to individuals. Hence a trivialisation of the indi-
vidual v-constructed by x has to be substituted for x: [0Tr x] serves this 
purpose, (Tr/(1 )the function that returns the trivialisation of its ar-
gument). The result of 
 [0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0[w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]]  
is the construction C/1 to which Ch(arles)/ is related by the explicit be-
lief Be/(1). The construction C v-constructs the proposition that the x 
is a G. 
 This technical ‘trick’ makes the variable x free to be -abstracted on, 
and the property of being explicitly believed by Charles to be a G gets 
the analysis: 
 wt x [0Bewt 0Ch [0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0[w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]]].   
                                                 
12  For details see Tichý (1988), Materna (1997), Duží (2006). 
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The sentence ‘The F is explicitly believed by Charles to be a G’ is ana-
lysed as 
 (9)  wt [[wt x [0Bewt 0Ch [0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0[w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]]]]wt 0Fwt ]  
or β-equivalently 
 (9) wt [x [0Bewt 0Ch [0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0[w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]]] 0Fwt ]. 
 Note that since the variable x occurs now in the extensional de re con-
text the β-reduction substituting 0Fwt  for x is valid: 
 (9β) wt [0Bewt 0Ch [0Sub [0Tr 0Fwt] 0x 0[w*t* [0Gw*t* x]]]] 
0F de re – ‘… believes explicitly of the F that it is a G. 
The resulting construction (9) is expressed by the active variant of the 
de re attitude: 
 Charles believes of the F that he/she/it is a G. 
The anaphoric reference he/she/it expresses the free variable x for which 
Trivialisation of the individual playing the role of the F is substituted.13  
 Note that (9, 9ββ – de re) are again not equivalent to (8 – de dicto), 
namely for the same reasons as set out above (existential presupposition, 
and substitutability of a co-occupied office in the de re case, unlike the de 
dicto case), but this time even the additional ‘fresh premise’ of the agent’s 
knowledge of the occupancy of the office F does not make it possible to 
perform logical transformations between de dicto and de re. These more 
realistic explicit attitudes are, the other way around, also non-realistic: 
This time our agent is deprived of any inferential capabilities.  
 We might introduce some classes of axioms and rules to characterise 
explicit attitudes, which would serve to tune the agents into various cat-
egories, according to particular inference rules the agents are capable of 
using, beginning with the simplest ones (e.g. the commutativity of con-
junction and disjunction) up to some sophisticated rules. But this epis-
temic task, characteristic of resource-bounded belief revision, is out of 
the scope of the present study. 
 We have seen that using particular points of view is a way of disam-
biguating our statements. If we claim, ‘Charles believes that nuclear 
power is dangerous’, we have to take into account the fact that Charles’ 
                                                 
13  For details on the analysis of sentences with anaphoric reference see Duží (2006a).  
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belief cannot be absolute in the sense of nuclear power’s being absolutely 
dangerous. Charles probably believes so, because he has applied the cri-
terion of physical and chemical properties of nuclear power, or any simi-
lar viewpoint. So he actually believes that nuclear power is dangerous 
from the point of view of its explosive power (or any other criterion of 
his evaluation). The question is whether an agent can ever ascribe to the 
viewed object any such vague property like being dangerous absolutely. 
A possible conclusion might be: The agent always applies some point of 
view to evaluate an object using a particular criterionthus obtaining  
a propositionwhen arriving at his attitude to the object of his belief. 
The question is, however, whether the resulting proposition is referred 
to in a faithful, authentic way. We have shown that there are two kinds 
of an attitude report, namely de dicto and de re, and two ways of under-
standing (analyzing) them: as implicit (propositional) vs. explicit (hyper-
propositional). Which of them, if any, is logically entailed by applying  
a particular viewpoint, and which can be taken as just being justified or 
explained by the viewpoint application? 
 At this point, a dialogue between a reporter R and an agent A might 
again help to elucidate our ideas: 
 R: Do you believe that the Pope is an old man? 
 A: No, I don’t. 
 R: Why not? Surely you know that the Pope is already over 80. 
 A: Yes, from the point of view of age, the Pope is an old man, but 
from the point of view of his vitality, he is not an old man. 
 Now, a conclusive report on agent’s attitudes to which the agent does 
assent can be de dicto only: 
The agent a believes that the Pope is an old man from the view-point 
of his age, but that he is not an old man from the view point of his vi-
tality. 
 Analysis de dicto: 
 wt [[0Bewt a 0[wt [[0Vwt 0Age 0Popewt] = wt [0Oldwt 0Popewt]]]]   
[0Bewt a 0[wt [[0Vwt 0Vital 0Popewt] = wt [0Oldwt 0Popewt]]]]]. 
 Here the equality =/(  ) is a relation between propositions. The 
reporter does not accuse the agent of any paradoxical belief. Due to the 
vagueness of an empirical property like Old the borderline between  
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a positive and a negative ascription is not sharp and can depend on  
a given viewpoint. 
 Actually, no other report of the situation would be fully adequate in 
this case. If there is another premise to the effect that the agent knows 
that Ratzinger is the Pope, the reporter might use the explicit de re way. 
If the reporter uses any other equivalent way, the agent does not have to 
assent to his report, because he only ‘implicitly’ knows, believes, etc., so-
and-so, without being explicitly aware of it.14 
 There are still some other problems connected with disambiguation. 
Simple expressions do not have to represent simple constructions, i.e. 
just trivialisations of denoted properties. Moreover, empirical properties 
are usually to some extent vague. What does it exactly mean that some-
body is old or that something is dangerous? When would we say that 
small tree is a shrub? These problems may be partly overcome by using 
an ontological definition,15 i.e. a complex construction of the property in 
question. For instance, the property of being a cat can be defined more 
precisely using a biological definition: A cat is a domestic carnivorous fe-
line, etc. But in that case there is another question as to whether this com-
plex construction constructs exactly the property which the agent has in 
mind when using a simple concept. Logic, which cannot take into account 
psychological and pragmatic perspectives, cannot answer this question. 
We will deal with ontological definitions in the following Section 5.  
5. Concepts and ontological definitions. 
The conceptual viewpoint 
A special case of using various points of view concerning one and the 
same object can be described only after explaining how our theory expli-
cates the term concept. 
 In Materna (1998) it has been shown that set-theoretical explications 
of this term are connected with insurmountable difficulties. Concepts 
should be construed as structured, complex objects, something like abstract 
procedures that are encoded by expressions and identify those objects (if 
                                                 
14  Therefore, a precise analysis of the reasons for particular attitudes, i.e. the analysis of 
applying points of view and evaluating their criteria, and properly reporting such  
a situation, might to some extent explicate the role of fuzzy logics. 
15  See Materna (1998). 
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any) that are denoted by these expressions; cf. the Frege-Church schema 
in §2. Obviously one of the best options is construction as defined above. 
Thus concept can be defined (roughly) as a closed construction, i.e., a con-
struction that does not contain free variables. 
 There are some sophisticated steps that make it possible to ignore 
some distinctions between constructions w.r.t. the notion of concept. As 
an example consider the constructions 
 x [0> x 00] 
 y [0> y 00] 
and observe that both construct the class of positive (real) numbers. Be-
ing distinct, they all the same represent one and the same concept, they 
are not distinguishable from the conceptual point of view, because the 
procedure for arriving at the set is the same regardless of which variable 
is used here.16 
 Let X be any object except a construction. The construction 0X will be 
called a simple concept of X. Finally, conceptual systems17 are based on a set 
of simple concepts (primitive concepts of the given system) and the set of 
complex concepts that can be derived from these primitives using varia-
bles, trivialisation, composition, closure and double-execution. The ty-
pes over which the variables can range in the given conceptual system 
are called pre-concepts thereof. 
 Now let C and C’ be two equivalent concepts, at least one of which is 
not simple. Being equivalent to C’ means that C identifies (constructs) 
the same object o as C’. This time, however, we cannot speak about a par-
tial characterisation of o (the constructed object o is fully determined by 
C as well as by C’). All the same we probably feel that we are justified in 
saying something like, From the viewpoint of C the object ‘behaves’ so and so, 
whereas its ‘behaviour’ from the viewpoint of C’ is ... .  
 C and C’ can be non-empirical or empirical concepts. The former case is 
simpler. Compare the following concepts (x, y range over real numbers): 
                                                 
16  This does not mean that all pairs of equivalent concepts (those which construct one and 
the same object) would represent just one concept. Only the so-called quasi-identical 
constructions do so. Roughly, they are constructions that differ only by being unneces-
sarily -expanded, or constructions that are α-equivalent, i.e., that differ only by ‘re-
naming’ -bound variables. See Materna (2004). 
17  Needless to stress that conceptual systems defined in this way differ from what Put-
nam has called conceptual scheme. 
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 x [0> x 00], 
 x [0 y [0= y [0x]]]. 
 Both concepts construct the set of positive real numbers. The first of 
them does it ‘from the viewpoint of’, say, ordering, the second takes into 
account the possibility of extracting the square root. Such cases are simple 
in that one can always prove the equivalence of the respective concepts.  
 More problems arise when both concepts are empirical. Then, in gen-
eral, their equivalence cannot be demonstrated simply by offering a ma-
thematical/logical proof. True, sometimes it is possible: when both concepts 
are members of the same conceptual system (i.e. determined by the same 
set of simple concepts) then one of them may arise through equivalent 
transformation, which is a matter of logic. The problematic (and more in-
teresting) cases are those ones where the concepts belong to distinct con-
ceptual systems. We can imagine the situation where one concept is  
a member of a conceptual system of a fragment of physics and the other 
one belongs to a conceptual system of some fragment of chemistry; do 
not forget that not only primitive concepts of both systems but also their 
pre-concepts, i.e., types, can differ. This would be the case, for example, 
if we would ask: What is water from the viewpoint of physics, and what 
is water from the viewpoint of chemistry?  
 But might such a question not be futile? Isn’t the ‘physically viewed’ 
water the same object (only viewed from another ‘perspective’) as the 
‘chemically viewed’ water? And what about the concept of water that 
underlies the expression ‘water’ of ordinary language?  
 To demonstrate equivalence in our example (which can be easily 
generalised) we would have to eliminate such cases where we would 
have to state either that something is water according to the ‘physical 
definition’ but not according to the ‘chemical definition’ or vice versa. If 
these cases were not eliminable then it would mean that there were some 
property, viz. being water some features of which are determined by one 
of the concepts and, maybe, some other features by the other concept; 
partiality of the characterisation would return, and the property being 
water would be what underlies natural language, whereas ‘physical wa-
ter’ and ‘chemical water’ would be some other properties. 
 A special case of equivalence of empirical concepts can be stated 
when this equivalence is analytical and can be transformed to a logical 
equivalence. In terms of conceptual systems this case can be described as  
a transition from a conceptual system CS to another CS’, the latter being 
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a ‘decomposition’ of the former.18 The following example shows, inter alia, 
what is meant by decomposition.  
 Let the initial conceptual system contain the primitive concept  
0the_father_of (father/()). Let the ‘decomposing’ conceptual system 
contain concepts 0a_parent (parent/()) and 0male (male/()) (and be-
sides some logical concepts, among others the ‘singulariser’ 0, / (()) ). 
Compare the concepts 
 0the_father_of 
and 
 wt y [0 [x [0 [0a_parentwt xy] [0malewt x]]]]. 
 Both concepts identify the same intension: to see this it is sufficient to 
know English. The second concept makes explicit the requisites of this 
intension. Therefore it is the second concept (not the first!) that makes it 
possible to logically prove that the sentence ‘Every father is a man’ is  
a logical tautology.19 
 What connects this example with the problem of distinct points of view 
of one and the same object? The object in question is here the individual 
role the father of X. Can we say that by using the system where the re-
spective concept is primitive we apply another viewpoint on this role than 
by using the above decomposition of the former system? In a sense we 
can: in the former case no special viewpoint, no special ‘perspective’ is as-
sumed (this is always the case when simple concepts are used); in the lat-
ter case the viewpoint is given by the attributes being a relative (whose one 
value is being a parent) and sex/gender (whose one value is male).  
 Also in such cases, i.e., in the cases of viewpoints given by conceptual 
distinction, the scheme of the type(s) of point of view can be preserved, 
this time in the extensional version:  
 V/(  ), 
where , the type of the criterion, is the set of attributes the constructions 
of which are members of the content of the given concept. In our exam-
ple we could perhaps write schematically 
                                                 
18  For details see Materna (2004). 
19  So decomposition is to make explicit some constructions needed for particular infer-
ences. 
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 [0V { } the-father-of]     (the first case) 
and 
 [0V {relative, sex} the-father-of]    (the second case). 
The resulting proposition in this second case is The father of X is a male 
parent of X. The first case does not lead to any proposition, as the set of 
attributes (the criterion of evaluation might consist of) is empty. 
 We have seen that the trivialisation of an object X, i.e. 0X, delivers 
immediately X without any perspective. Hence we cannot logically de-
duce any non-trivial consequences from analyses using trivialisations of 
the denoted objects. For instance, from [0Prime 07], where Prime/() is 
the set of prime numbers, no interesting consequences can be inferred. 
But if we know what ‘prime’ means, we also know that the following ar-
guments are valid: 
 7 is a prime number. 
 Hence 7 is divisible by 1 and 7 only. 
 Hence 7 is not divisible by 2, or by 3, or by 5, etc. 
 This means that a simple expression E is usually not connected with 
the trivialisation of the object O that E denotes, but that a complex concept 
that identifies the object O is assigned to E as its meaning. Therefore we 
define: 
Each complex nonempty concept C is an ontological definition of the 
object O constructed by C (read: concept C defines the object O). 
 Example: 
 An ontological definition of (the class of) prime numbers/() is: 
 x [[0Nat x]  [0Card y [[0Nat y]  [0Div x y]]] = 02]  
(Here: Nat/() is the class of natural numbers, Card/( ()) is the func-
tion number of elements, Div/() is the numerical relation being divisible by.) 
 This is not the common way of using the term ‘definition’; there is no 
definiendum and definiens. By a ‘definition’ we usually understand the fol-
lowing schema: 
 Expression E1 (definiendum) =df  expression E2 (definiens). 
 From the logical point of view, this is a linguistic definition. It associ-
ates expression E1 (which is usually, but not necessarily, a simple expres-
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sion that has not been used in the language so far) with the meaning of 
the expression E2. 
 Examples:  
 Primes =df Numbers that have exactly two factors 
 Cat =df Domestic carnivorous animal, a feline, … 
 The father of =df the male parent of  
 Bachelor =df an unmarried man 
 Note that ontological definitions do not obey the schema of definien-
dum = definiens; they are not definitions of terms (i.e. meaning assign-
ments), but of objects. Hence ontological definitions are prior to linguis-
tic ones. An ontological definition does not assign a meaning to an ex-
pression. Instead it defines a particular kind of object and does so by cir-
cumscribing a concept that identifies the object. At the same time, con-
cepts are the senses of expressions. In other words, linguistic definition 
assigns a (new) meaning to E1, namely the ontological definition of the 
object denoted by E2, i.e., it makes the two expressions synonymous on 
the basis of linguistic convention. 
 Using a conceptual system C in which 0prime is a primitive concept 
and which does not contain any of the simple concepts 0Div or 0Card as 
primitive, we could not use the above ontological definition of primes. 
But in this case we certainly do understand ‘prime’ just in the sense of 
this definition, which means that we use some more decomposed con-
ceptual system C’ (containing, at least, 0Nat, 0Div and 0Card). Of course, 
a deeper decomposition is still possible, which would, for instance, ena-
ble us to define the set of natural numbers on the basis of, say, the Peano 
axioms. Thus simple expressions often do not express primitive concepts 
(i.e., trivialisations of the denoted object) of a given conceptual system, 
but complex concepts composed of simpler primitive concepts of  
a finer decomposed conceptual system, see also Materna (2004). 
 An a priori discipline, logic, cannot substitute the role of empirical 
disciplines, like linguistics, biology, physics, etc. Hence logic cannot pro-
vide, e.g., an ontological definition of the property of being a cat, nor can 
it decide whether the respective definition is ‘correct’ in the sense of 
identifying exactly the same property as the one which is understood by 
‘cat’ in a natural language such as English. Nor can logic impose prag-
matic features and decide which conceptual system an agent has used. 
 Instead, one of the tasks of logic is to build up particular logical (axi-
omatic) theories. If a set of ontological definitions is furnished by  
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a linguist (or biologist, physicist, etc), logic provides rules of inference 
enabling us to deduce logical consequences of these definitions (axioms). 
Hence having particular ontological (and linguistic) definitions at our 
disposal, we can look at primes, cats, water, etc. from particular (mathe-
matical, biological, physical, etc) points of view; this time we can obtain 
either a partial characterisation or even a total characterisation of a given 
intension/extension. 
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Errata 
In “Points of View from a Logical Perspective (I)” (Organon F 13, 2006, No. 3, 277 
– 305) we introduced the notion of a requisite, an analytical relation between in-
tensions. We defined the case of a property being a requisite of another property 
(Reqpr), or of an office (Reqof). And we also defined typical properties for a property 
or for an office. Unfortunately, we did not take into account the possibly properly 
partial character of the respective intensions. Since the requisite relation is valid 
independently of the fact whether a property is instantiated or an office occupied, 
we have to use the property of propositions (of being true), True/( ), where 
[0Truewt P] v-constructs the truth-value T iff Pwt, otherwise F. The definition has 
thus to be corrected as follows: 
 Let p, q be variables of 1st order, ranging over properties (), c a variable 
ranging over offices , x a variable ranging over . We define: 
 Reqpr =df  pq wt x [[0Truewt wt [qwt x]]  [0Truewt wt [pwt x]]] 
(p is a requisite of q) 
 Reqof =df  pc wt [[0Ewt c]  [0Truewt wt [pwt cwt]]] 
(p is a requisite of the office c) 
 TPpr =df  pqe wt x [[0Truewt wt [ewt x]]  
     [[0Truewt wt [qwt x]]  [0Truewt wt [pwt x]]]] 
(p is typical of q, unless e) 
 TPof =df  pce wt [[0Ewt c]  [[0Truewt wt [ewt cwt]]  [0Truewt wt [pwt cwt]]]] 
(p is typical of the office c, unless e) 
where E/() is the property of existence, and e ranges over ‘exceptions’, ‘the 
unless properties’/(), the so-called guards of the rule in Artificial Intelligence. 
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